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GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE NEW TRADE AGREEMENT
After five and a half years of arduous negotiations among
ninety-nine countries, the Tokyo Round' of Multi-lateral Trade
Negotiations (MTN) was concluded in April, 1979. The purpose of
the talks was to revise the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),2 the principal document governing world commerce since
1948.1 The negotiations were aimed at liberalizing world trade by
providing extensive tariff cuts and designing international trade
codes to lower non-tariff barriers (NTBs).4 According to the
"Tokyo Declaration," which gave birth to the Tokyo Round Nego-
1. These negotiations will be referred to as both the "Tokyo Round" and the "MTN."
For background on the Tokyo Round, see Wolff, The U.S. Mandatefor Trade Negotiations,
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1976).
2. GATT is an acronym for General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a multilateral
agreement promulgated in 1947 which contains a comprehensive set of substantive obliga-
tions and procedures relating to international trade policy. Openedfor signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat., pt. 5, at A(ll), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
The acronym is also used to describe the institution that has grown up to service the agree-
ment and furnishes a variety of organizational services in related areas. For more complete
background information about GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 35-37 (1969).
3. The GATT rules were to have been one component of a more comprehensive Inter-
national Trade Organization, which in turn was to have joined with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund to form the pillars of the international economic system after
World War II. When the International Trade Organization collapsed in 1949, principally
because Congress failed to ratify the treaty establishing it, the GATT rules became the nu-
cleus of a small international organization. On reasons for the failure of the ITO, see W.
DIEBOLD, THE END OF THE ITO (1959), cited in JACKSON, supra note 2 at 2 n.7. The legal
design of GATT was taken almost verbatim from the ITO Charter. See UNITED STATES
DEP'T. OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (Pub.
No. 2598, Commercial Policy series, No. 93, 1946).
4. Declaration of Ministers, Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, para. 5, re-
printedin BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 19, 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Declaration of Ministers]. NTBs are obstacles to trade caused by practices other than
tariffs. Such barriers include national policies to encourage purchase at home, exclusionary
product standards, and duty assessment methods that artificially inflate import duties. For
further discussion of these types of barriers to trade, see Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating
Non-Tariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 327 (1975); J. JACKSON, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 15 (1977).
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tiations, these talks were to have called for "improvements in the
international framework for the conduct of world trade."5 In a
marked departure from past GATT practice, the negotiators recog-
nized the need to adopt "differential measures" in order to give de-
veloping countries "special and more favourable treatment."
6
The agreements presented as the final treaty received the sig-
natures of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Scandi-
navian countries, Japan, Canada, and the United States.7 The
remaining members of the negotiations, principally developing
countries, boycotted the signing ceremony and have persisted in re-
fusing to adopt the provisions of the treaty.' These countries
charge that the new agreement does not stimulate "freer trade" as
claimed, but rather strengthens protectionist barriers9 to the detri-
ment of poor countries. They further accuse the MTN of failing to
provide the special advantages originally promised to developing
countries. i0
These negotiated trade arrangements have the legal character
of draft provisions, but are without any binding force until incorpo-
rated into GATT." Consequently, there remains the unresolved
issue of whether the resulting instrument would succeed as a viable
amendment or modification to GATT if it is not adopted by a ma-
jority of the negotiating parties of GATT.
The continuous disregard and flagrant violations of GATT
rules and principles underscore the present lack of confidence in
the trading system. A major objective of the Tokyo Round was to
modernize the international trading system by improving the pro-
cedures for intergovernmental cooperation on trade matters. With
an increasingly interdependent, and more competitive world econ-
omy, negotiation of an effective document to regulate unfair trade
5. GATT Doc. MTN/28 (April 11, 1979); see generaly Graham, Results of the Tokyo
Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 157 (1979).
6. Id
7. The Procts Verbal was signed by the representatives of Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the nine nations of the European Economic Com-
munity, Finland, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States. Id at 153 n.l.
8. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1979, at DI, col. 4.
9. Protectionist barriers include both tariff and non-tariff barriers. For further analysis
of tariff barriers see Beige, Seeking a New Accomodation in International Markets, in A RE-
PORT OF THE TRILATERAL TASK FORCE ON COMMODITY IssuEs (1976).
10. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1979, at DI, col. 4.
11. To be incorporated, approval is required by a two-thirds majority of the contracting
parties to the organization. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 42.
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practices promised significant assistance toward keeping world
commerce fair as well as free. Against a backdrop of international
economic turmoil - energy shortages, sluggish economic growth,
inflation, unemployment, and increased pressures for trade protec-
tionism-this round of negotiations presented a significant oppor-
tunity to enhance international confidence in the system by
formulating a new set of trade guidelines that would protect free
trade and make international commerce universally more accessi-
ble. Yet, failure to give attention to Gatt's institutional problems at
the Tokyo Round and provide the framework necessary to incorpo-
rate the new rules will nullify any successful results of the negotia-
tions. Consequently, the resulting trade schedules and agreements
will only be worthwhile if there is adequate conformity to them; but
such conformity may be severely hampered by the absence of an
effective regulatory instrument in the international trading system
capable of instituting the results.
This Comment examines the legal relationship between the
final trade package offered by the MTN and GATT. Specifically, it
analyzes the impact of the Tokyo Round on the GATT system and
discusses the legal basis under GATT for applying the new trade
codes. Part I examines GATT as it existed prior to the Tokyo
Round, focusing on the lack of conformity to its rules and general
principles, and the ensuing need for reform of its institutional
framework. Part II reviews the effect of the adopted trade agree-
ment upon international trade and analyzes its impact toward liber-
alizing future trade policies. It also describes the Tokyo Round's
failure to provide institutional remedies for GATT's dilapidated
framework. In Part III the GATT requirements for adoption of
trade codes are examined, followed by an investigation of the
Tokyo Round's compliance with those requirements. This exami-
nation considers the legal problems of attempting to apply the new
codes on a conditional basis and thus deny non-signatories the ben-
efits of these trade concessions. The controversy over the proposed
safeguard code is then discussed: it includes an explanation of how
these temporary import restrictions are used and an analysis of the
principal legal restraints to the adoption of the code. In conclusion,
this Comment explores the resulting enervation of the international
trading system due to the demise of the GATT system.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GATT
GATT is a body of rules that has been formulated for the pro-
Vol. I I
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motion and maintenance of an open and fair international trading
system.' 2 Originally, GATT was to provide general protection
against evasion of tariff commitments made during the first com-
prehensive World Trade Conference held in Havana in 1948.13
Since then, GATT has slowly assumed the character of a perma-
nent trade organization, undertaking many of the functions and re-
sponsibilities intended to have been undertaken by the proposed
International Trade Organization (ITO),' 4 which failed to come
into existence. 5 These rules provide more than general principles
to influence international trade arrangements; they embody specific
procedures that govern the aim and scope of international trade
negotiations.' 6
GATT, like many other international organizations, convokes
conferences under regulating rules and procedures that direct the
organization and its members. ' Tariff negotiations are the domi-
nant concern at such conferences, which often result in new sched-
ules that are incorporated into the General Agreement.' 8 The new
schedules assume the form of multilateral commitments which not
only constitute a part of GATT, but also belong to the body of law
of international organizations. ' Thus, due to their incorporation
into the General Agreement, the tariff schedules lose the character
of independent bilateral agreements between the negotiating parties
and become legal norms of the organization and the international
12. See GATT, supra note 2. The Agreement has been modified in several respects
since 1947. The current version is contained in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BiSD (1969) [hereinafter cited as 4 BISD].
13. See generally B. GUPTA, A STUDY OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE 1-23 (1967); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANI-
ZATION 10-16 (1970).
14. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at § 2.4.
15. For the history of GATT, see JACKSON, supra note 4, at 396-401.
16. See Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade
Negotiations in the Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I, 1-3 (1979). For more information
about the scope of GATT rules see generally JACKSON, supra note 2, at 192.
17. See Skubiszewski, Forms of Participation of International Organizations in the Law-
making Processes, 18 INT'L ORG. 790 (1964); see also BISD (Supp. VII 1960) (for the proce-
dural obligations of the Committee Members for the Intersessional Periods Between the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Sessions).
18. BISD 82, § vii(15) (Supp. IV 1956) (rules and procedures for incorporation of tariff
concession schedules into text of GATT treaty).
19. There are various forms of participation by international organizations in the law
making processes on the international level which are expressed in different roles. Such a
role may range from simple preparatory and subsidiary actions that help states to conclude
treaties or to adopt nonbinding resolutions bearing on international law, to participation as a
party to certain treaties, or to enactment of different kinds of regulations including rules
directly binding on states and substituting for treaties; see Skubiszewski, supra note 17.
4
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community.2" The GATT process of lawmaking, therefore, in-
volves a combination of treaty-making and constitutive acts of an
international organization.
GATT provides a forum and framework for continuous tariff
negotiations, endeavoring to reflect the basic principles of reci-
porocity and most-favored-nation status (MFN). 21 Within the pur-
pose and guidelines of GATT, contracting parties have made
continuous efforts to reduce barriers to international trade.22 Pro-
cedures for the enforcement of tariff schedules are also contained in
the General Agreement. 23  Instead of referring disputes or ques-
tions of interpretation to the International Court of Justice, the
General Agreement provides for renegotiation of tariff concessions
and for consultation and conciliation to encourage the peaceful so-
lution of trade conflicts. 24 There is no internal tribunal to resolve
disputes, and the task of exercising judicial functions has been dele-
gated to subsidiary bodies and working groups, with final decisions
made by the plenary membership of the organization. 25 These dis-
pute settlement procedures do not afford a system of sanctions for
violations of the agreement, but rely instead on the principle of
"reciprocity" and maintaining a balance of obligations and rights;
20. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 42-49.
21. Reciprocity is a major principle and cornerstone of GATT. It embodies a "give and
take" concept implying a mutuality of gains in MTN by providing equivalent concessions to
concession pledging parties. The Most-Favored-Nation principle means non-discrimination;
i.e., any tariff concessions negotiated among two GATT contracting parties should be ex-
tended automatically and unconditionally to all other contracting parties. A short and pre-
cise presentation of the Most-Favored-Nation principle and its present significance in GATT
is given in Espiell, The Maost-Favored-Nation Clause, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 29 (1971).
22. See, e.g., GATT, BISD (Supp. VIII 1960); see also Rehm, Developments in the Law
and Institutions of International Economic Relations." The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (1968).
23. See, e.g., the following Articles of the General Agreement: Article XXII, "Consul-
tation"; Article XXIII, "Nullification or Impairment"; Article XXVII, "Withholding or
Withdrawal of Concession"; and Article XXVIII, "Modification of Schedules." 4 BISD,
supra note 12.
24. Nothing in the General Agreement prohibits individual contracting parties from
submitting their disputes to the International Court of Justice. However, according to the
interpretative rules of the Chairman of the Contracting parties, "neither a government, nor
the contracting parties acting jointly could take a ruling of the Contracting Parties to the
Court." See GATT, Analytical Index, at 43, para. 3 (March 3d rev. 1970). Nevertheless, if
the requisites of jurisdiction are otherwise present, individual parties may refer disputes to
the I.C.J., but the GATT is not a source of such jurisdiction. Nor can the I.C.J. proceedings
be considered an appeal from any GATT decision, see DAM, supra note 13, at 351.
25. See generally S. GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATtONS, 1973-75: A GUIDE TO THE IS-
SUES (British-North American Committee 1974); GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1974 (1975);
BISD 249-50 (Supp. III 1955), as noted in KOLASA, infra note 103, at 37 n.83.
Vol. I I
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that is, the failure to respect a tariff agreement would produce a
reciprocal response of equal effect from the injured country.26
In practice, however, the GATT rules have not served as rules
of general application, but are more akin to the provisions of a con-
tract - each party having an interest in keeping the good will of
the other parties.27 In this sense, there is no effective outside en-
forcement, and each party is free to renegotiate the meaning of the
contract whenever circumstances make such action favorable. 28
Consequently, a tendency has developed among participating na-
tions to regard GATT rules as merely a reference for initial negoti-
ation and compromise, rather than actually conforming their
practices to these codes. Hence, controversies are bargained away
according to economic expediency and the political congeries of the
countries involved.29
Nations which are increasing their dependency on interna-
tional trade are tending to ignore the specific rules and procedures
of GATT.30 Several reasons have been offered to explain their dis-
regard for the treaty in the conduct of world trade. First, GATT's
obsolescence in terms of its failure to rectify the status of develop-
ing countries within the organization3 and its relative silence con-
cerning non-tariff barriers has resulted in noncompliance by some
members.32 Secondly, aspirations for liberalizing trade arrange-
ments have been frustrated by the strict operating procedures out-
26. Article XXIII provides that if a contracting party fails to live up to substantive obli-
gations those contracting parties thereby affected may suspend the application to the offend-
ing contracting party "of such concessions or other obligations ... as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances." Although Article XXIII does not require the concessions
suspended to be of equal value to the concessions nullified or impaired, there is evidence that
such a test is considered appropriate in GATT circles. See the reference to "equivalent obli-
gations or concessions" in BISD 95 (Supp. XI 1963).
27. See Maciel, Brazil's Proposalsfor the Reform afthe G,4 77' System, I WORLD ECON.
163, 163-64 (1978); see also DAM, supra note 13, at 3-5.
28. See Roschke, The G,4T7 Problems and Prospects, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 85, 89-90
(1977); Hudec, G,4 77 or G,4BB. The Future Design ofthe GeneralAgreement on Tarifs and
Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1365 (1971). In Hudec's opinion, "most developed country [sic]
governments seem to display a fundamental appreciation of the need for some self-restraint
without formal obligations."
29. Roschke, supra note 28, at 90; accord Hudec, supra note 28, at 1366.
30. See generally Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of International Trade, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978).
31. Roschke, supra note 28, at 92; Hudec, supra note 28, at 1349.
32. Roschke, supra note 28, at 87. See generally JACKSON, supra note 2, at 517-22 for a
broad survey of non-tariff barriers and their effects on compliance with GATT.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol11/iss2/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
lined in GATT.33 Finally, import competition and balance of
payment deficits have precipitated domestic political pressures
causing governments to impose import restrictions regardless of
GATT prohibitions.34 As a result, GATT's viability as an interna-
tional organization has been undermined, with its rigid provisions
considered dated and irrelevant to the interests of contemporary
trade policies.35
These factors, in addition to the need for renegotiation of tariff
schedules, prompted the latest round of negotiations, the most com-
prehensive and far-reaching since the establishment of GATT.3 6
Launched as a multilateral effort to remove trade barriers, the
Tokyo Round has proven more ambitious than its six predecessors
which were sponsored by GATT.3 7 These talks represented the first
effort by the international community since the late 1940's to
restructure some of the more fundamental rules of international
trade and negotiate substantial reductions in non-tariff barriers
(NTBs).38 Because of GATT's outdated rules and largely ignored
procedures, members were anxious to reach a new consensus on
international trade relations and preserve a modicum of coopera-
tion in world trade.39 Fearful that GATT might be totally aban-
doned, foreign ministers from nearly one hundred nations4°
decided to initiate negotiations that would not only reduce barriers
which impede or distort international trade, but also improve the
international framework for the conduct of world trade.4'
The second major goal set for the Tokyo Round was to grant
special treatment to developing countries. 42 This call for special
treatment by developed countries was supported by years of
promises from the United States and the EEC that they would
grant concessions in trade without requiring reciprocal treatment.43
33. Roschke, supra note 28, at 89; see also Jackson, The New Economic Policy and the
United States International Obligations, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 110, 112 (1972).
34. Id at 94.
35. See generally id at 86-94, for the general reasons of the decline in GATT compli-
ance as well as an analysis of the pressures to violate specific clauses.
36. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 18 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 60 (1979); reprinted in 44 FED. REG. 1933 (1979).
37. They were: 1947-Geneva; 1949-Annecy; 1951-Torquay; 1956-Geneva; 1960-61-Ge-
neva; and 1963-67-Geneva (known as the Kennedy Round).
38. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 4, at para. 5, BISD 21 (Supp. XX).
39. See Graham, supra note 5, at 157.
40. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 4, at para. 5, BISD 21 (Supp. XX).
41. DIEBOLD, supra note 3, at 22.
42. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 4, at para. 5, BISD 21 (Supp. XX).
43. See C. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 103
Vol. I I
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This objective involved the enactment of an "enabling clause"
within GATT to release contracting parties from the obligation of
reciprocity in trade concessions.' As evidence of their intent, the
contracting parties of GATT opened trade negotiations to all coun-
tries of the world, not just GATT members.45 As a result, ninety-
nine countries - about two-thirds of which were developing coun-
tries, participated in the negotiations.' The MTN thus provided
the necessary forum for developed countries to make a firm legal
commitment to incorporate a system of preferences into the Gen-
eral Agreement.47
II. "ACCOMPLISHMENTS" OF THE TOKYO ROUND
A. Framework Reform
The Tokyo Round's accomplishments were modest but not
completely insignificant in the area of framework reform.48 Since
GATT was not procedurally ready for the adoption of non-tariff
codes, nor equipped to manage the sharply increased administra-
tive burdens that would result,49 an elaboration and revision of
GATT rules was necessary to maintain the changes attempted by
the new trade codes. Also the broadened scope of activities regu-
lated by GATT as a consequence of incorporating into GATT the
participation of developing countries, required a redesign of
GATT's framework. ° Unfortunately, the Tokyo Round did not
(1967); for an extended discussion of the Generalized System of Preferences see Graham,
The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries." International Innova-
tion and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513 (1978).
44. See Graham, supra note 5, at 170.
45. Ibrahim, Developing Countries and the Tokyo Round, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 1
(1978).
46. Id at 21.
47. There exists another international forum where multilateral trade bargaining is con-
ducted. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was cre-
ated as a council to consider the terms of world trade in an effort to obtain afairer exchange
among nations. Thus, UNCTAD tends to be more of a political organization that provides
general resolutions on trade matters, whereas GATT provides definite agreements containing
specific obligations. E. LUARD, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES: THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK
OF INTERDEPENDENCE 202-07 (1977).
48. See GATT Doc. GATr/1234 (April 12, 1979), a press release setting forth a state-
ment by the GATT Director General and a description of the Tokyo Round Agreements,
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 553 (1979). A copy of the Agreement can be found in 18
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1052 (1979); reproducedfrom GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/21 I/Rev. 2
& Add. I of April 12, 1979.
49. Graham, supra note 16, at 39-40; also Marks & Malmgren, supra note 4, at 328-29.
50. See Maciel, supra note 27 for suggested reforms to GATI that would allow coin-
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provide this desired reform.
5'
Included in the mandate for improvements in the international
trading framework were efforts to relax some of the strict proce-
dures which were openly violated by GATT members, yet give
more bite to some of the weaker provisions. 52 Negotiations on the
use of trade restrictions for balance-of-payments equilibrium re-
sulted in the recognition of tariff surcharges, which had not previ-
ously been recognized by GATT.53 The accord on. export
restrictions merely expressed the need for further examination of
the adequacy of GATT provisions.54 In the area of safeguards,
which historically has been strictly disciplined under Article XIX,
55
developed countries wanted to eliminate the requirements of com-
pensation, the right of retaliation, and the strict prohibition against
selective safeguards. 6 But, as the main targets of such import bar-
riers, developing countries were vehemently opposed to amending
these procedures, leaving the negotiations at a stalemate. 57 Refine-
ments of the dispute settlement procedures were successful in clari-
fying GATT sanctions by supplying details for the establishment of
panels and setting time limits for the hearings.58 However, most of
the individual non-tariff codes contain their own sets of provisions
plete incorporation of LDCs; see also Hudec, supra note 28, at 1347-49 on ignoring the disci-
pline of market forces for infant industry purposes.
51. See GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. (1979) (for the reforms recommended by
the negotiating group on framework reforms (1), discussed in Graham, supra note 5, at 169-
72.
52. Id.
53. Graham, supra note 5, at 172. Prior to the MTN, GATT articles permitted nations
to use only import quotas to deal with these emergencies. A tariff surcharge at least pre-
serves the possibility of continued market access for very efficient producers. A quota, by
contrast, is an absolute bar to market access no matter how efficient the producer may be.
Accordingly, tariff surcharges generally have been viewed as a less onerous form of import
restraint. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 715-16.
54. See Graham, supra note 5, at 172.
55. Article XIX of GATT requires advance notice and consultation, plus Most-Fa-
vored-Nation treatment in the use of safeguards. 4 BISD, supra note 12, at 36.
56. Graham, supra note 16, at 24-27. For further analysis of the safeguard problem see
discussion infra.
57. BUSINESS WEEK, April 9, 1979, at 33. The developing countries noted this concern
in their formal comment on the Status Report prepared by the industrialized countries. "The
Statement by some major trading nations does not adequately reflect certain issues of major
concern to developing countries and has omitted others, such as. . .the principle that safe-
guard actions should not discriminate against developing countries .. " Statement by
Delegations of Developing Countries on Current Status of Tokyo Round Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN/INF/38 (July 14, 1978).
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for handling disputes arising under these codes. 59
Despite these minor achievements, the negotiations failed to
cure the weak and ambiguous GATT procedures that discourage
dependence on the system. As a result, the new international trade
codes will be of dubious value without a procedural structure for
consultation, negotiation, and administration of the rules. The
Tokoyo Round's failure to achieve institutional improvement of
GATT may therefore cause increased uncertainty rather than as-
surance about the stability of international trade.60 In order to en-
courage international confidence and participation in GATT these
procedural loopholes must be alleviated.
B. Non-Tarf Codes
A key area of the Tokyo Round strategy for the liberalization
of GATT involved the development of new non-tariff codes of con-
duct.6 These codes were intended to improve the rules governing
international trade and to make GATT an effective instrument for
resolving non-tariff problems.62 The purpose of these "codes of
conduct" was to establish non-tariff measures which are clear, firm,
and equitable, and which set forth international procedures for
resolving trade grievances.63 Specifically, the new non-tariff meas-
ures attempt to discipline manipulation of market forces in several
key areas, including subsidies and countervailing duties, govern-
ment procurement, product standards, and customs valuation.64
Despite these ambitions, the negotiations were unable to cross some
difficult hurdles in designing effective GATT regulation of non-
tariff barriers. First, the negotiations lacked a spirit of reciprocal
bargaining by the parties, leaving little chance of reaching a com-
65prehensive agreement. Second, the inability to quantify the level
59. Id
60. Jackson, supra note 30, at 105; see also Graham, supra note 16, at 41-42.
61. Graham, supra note 16, at 4-5. For a definition of NTB see Corbet, Industrial Tar-
iffs andEconomic Spheres ofInfluence, IN SEARCH OF A NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER 199
(H. Corbet & J. Jackson eds. 1974), cited in Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 9 n.33.
62. Id Over 800 separate types of NTB have been identified by the GATT secretariat.
It has also been found that often several types of NTB serve the protection of a single indus-
try. Id. at 172.
63. See Multilateral Trade Negotiations, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, CURRENT
POLICY 56, (April 1979).
64. See Graham, supra note 5, at 161-69. See generally Lloyd, Strategiesfor Modifying
Non-TariffDistortions, in Corbet & Jackson, supra note 61, at 108; cited in Ibrahim, supra
note 45, at 9 n.33.
65. Tariff negotiators first agree upon a hypothesis or mathematical formula by which
all tariffs are, at least hypothetically, to be reduced. They then bargain over possible excep-
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of protection created by NTBs made international comparisons dif-
ficult and hampered the bargaining necessary for their liberaliza-
tion.66  Finally, since non-tariff barriers are very sensitive to
domestic economic policies there is a tendency to accentuate pro-
tectionist reactions rather than stimulate free trade.67
The negotiations were divided into a series of separate code
discussions which yielded some positive results.68 To regulate sub-
sidies69 and countervailing duties,70 a new code was designed that
would permit governments to impose countervailing duties against
subsidized imports only if they materially injure an industry in the
importing nation.7' The new code of subsidies also promises inter-
national discipline, for the first time under GATT, over agricultural
as well as industrial subsidies.72  As a corollary agreement, the
dumping code provides injured countries essentially the same kind
of relief as the subsidies code, allowing domestic governments to
impose penalties on dumped goods.73 The government purchasing
agreement requires all purchases by certain agencies to be from the
lowest priced foreign or domestic bidder.74  Under product stan-
dards, the new agreement prohibits the use of government stan-
dards that create "unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
75
tions or modifications of the formula with respect to specific products. For an analysis of
specific alternative formulas considered at the Tokyo Round, see W. CLINE, N. KRONSJO &
T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TOKYO ROUND 67-75 (1978), cited in Graham,
supra note 16, at 7 n.33.
66. Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 9.
67. Id
68. See CLINE, KRONSJO & WILLIAMS, supra note 65, at 75. See also Baldwin, The
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Toward Greater Liberalization?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN-
STITUTE-SPECIAL ESSAYS (1979).
69. GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232, Add. I/Rev. I, Add. 2 & Corr. 1, as amendedby
MTN/NTM/W/241/Rev. 1 (1969), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 579, 593 (1979).
70. Id Countervailing duties are the imposed response by importing countries to subsi-
dized products which cause "material injury to an established domestic industry," in an
amount sufficient to offset the subsidy. See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XVI(4), 4 BISD,
supra note 12, at 27. For a further analysis of subsidies and countervailing duty practices,
see Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination ofSubsidies, Border Tax Adjustments,
and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, I LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 17 (1969).
71. As a result, for a country to use countervailing duties as a response requires that
adverse affects upon the industries of the importing country be shown to the extent that it has
hurt their export markets, and such injury must be demonstrated by positive evidence.
GATT, supra note 2, at art. XVI(4).
72. Id art. 10; reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 599 (1979).
73. See note 51 supra (for reform recommended); see also Comment, Eliminating Non-
taritJ Barriers to International Trade.- The MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 12
NYU J INT'L L. & POL. 315 (1979) for an evaluation of the non-tariff provisions.
74. Graham, supra note 16, at 5; see Declaration of Ministers, supra note 4.
75. Graham, supra note 5, at 165. The revised version of the Anti-dumping Code brings
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Two technical agreements attempt to reduce the redtape of customs
valuation and licensing by insuring importers that the duties owed
on imported goods are based on fair appraisals of their value.
76
The talks yielded agricultural agreements which provide minimum
prices for certain dairy products, and an international meat council
that will watch the world supply and demand of meat.7
Even though the new trade pact offers some promising changes
in the treatment of non-tariff obstacles to trade, it does not provide
the kind of general reform necessary to fully combat such govern-
ment practices.78 Without an established principle under GATT
relating to NTB's and a procedure for dispute settlement, these ac-
complishments fall short of instituting within GATT "firm and
clear" measures for their treatment. As a result, the Tokyo Round
did not provide any significant dismantling of the distorting effects
of NTBs on international trade.
C Developing Countries
Another general goal of the Tokyo Round was to change the
GATT principle of equality in trade to allow special treatment of
developing countries. 79  Encouraged by this proposal, developing
certain of its provisions, notably those concerning determination of injury, price undertak-
ings between exporting and importing countries, and imposition and collection of anti-
dumping duties, into line with the corresponding provisions of the agreement on subsidies
and countervailing duties. GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232 Corr. 1, Add. I/Rev. I & Add. 2,
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 621 (1979); see also, Statement by GATT Director-Gen-
eral (April 12, 1979), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 576 (1979), describing the effects of
the new dumping code.
76. The code on government procurement could open up as much as twenty billion
dollars a year in foreign government purchasing markets now closed to United States ex-
ports, while at the same time preserving United States preferences for defense, small and
minority business contract set-asides, and purchases from countries such as Japan which
have not agreed to open their markets to the extent of other nations adopting the code. See
GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev. 2 & Add.I (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 1052 (1979); see 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 567 (1979) for further description of govern-
ment procurement regulations by GATT Director General.
77. Graham, supra note 5, at 166-67. This standards code will help assure that all coun-
tries move toward a system of openness in drafting product standard-setting procedures and
would reduce their use of hidden non-tariff barriers to trade through general guidelines and
effective international enforcement procedures. See The Draft Agreement on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/W/192/Rev. 5 (1979), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS.
1079 (1979).
78. Graham, supra note 5, at 167-69; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures,
GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/231/Rev.2 (1979).
79. Graham, supra note 5, at 172-73. International Dairy Agreement, GATT Doc.
MTN/DP/8 (1979); Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, GATT Doc. MTN/ME/8
(1979).
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countries supported the permanent establishment of a new prefer-
ence system within the framework of GATT. 80 In the area of tariffs
they desired a two-way liberalization: First, application of the pro-
posed tariff formula to all products of special interest to them and,
second, preference adjustments where erosion of their benefits oc-
curs.8 ' Developing countries stressed that a system is needed that
will improve their competitiveness in trade, not just offer limited
trade benefits in the form of aid programs.82
Developed countries were not, however, receptive to making
the preference system an institutional reality under GATT.83 In-
stead, they supported an "enabling clause," conditioned on a com-
mitment by developing countries to assume increased GATT
obligations commensurate to their stage of development. They also
insisted that special treatment not impede future tariff reductions
among developed countries.84 Since tariffs among developed part-
ners are already reduced, this kind of trade integration would
neither diversify the export structure of developing countries, nor
supply advantageous trade preferences.85 The system of prefer-
ences proposed by developed countries would not have the eco-
nomic impact on the direct transfer of resources needed between
developed and developing countries.86 Consequently, the final set
of understandings which were offered together as a "reform of the
framework of international trade" were at best modest accomplish-
ments for developing countries.
80. Graham, supra note 16, at 27; Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 19.
81. Throughout the Tokyo Round negotiations LDCs tried to draw the attention of
developed countries to two special demands of concern to them:
1) Whatever tariff cutting formula the developed countries agree upon, it
should be applied to products of export interest to LDCs not under the GSP in such
a way that deeper than average MFN cuts be achieved and particularly in cases
where LDCs are main suppliers; and
2) Tariff reductions on the MFN basis among developed countries are likely
to result in narrowing the GSP margins, hence eroding the trade benefits accuring
to LDCs under the GSP. Therefore, measures should be taken within the frame-
work of the MTN to prevent possible erosion of the GSP benefits and in cases
where this occurs compensation in the form of GSP improvement should be made.
Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 17; see Maciel, supra note 27, at 168.
82. Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 24.
83. Id
84. See Graham, supra note 5, at 171.
85. See Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 21.
86. GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2 (1979); A recent detailed study provides a
model to estimate the various effects of tariff liberalization, see Cline, Trade Welfare, and
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D. Tariffs
The negotiated tariff reductions, although less important to the
Tokyo Round than the agreements on nontariff barriers, neverthe-
less contributed to more equitable trading under GATT.87 How-
ever, since the talks concentrated on developed countries, the
eventual concessions granted no unusually favorable benefits to de-
veloping countries.88 For instance, tariff cuts averaged about
thirty-eight percent for developed countries, 89 compared to twenty-
five percent for developing countries.90 In addition, tariff provi-
sions favored a reduction of duties on materials principally of inter-
est to industrial nations. 9' In agriculture, developed countries
offered concessions on tropical products which are important ex-
ports of many developing countries. 92 However, since these prod-
ucts are of low price and relatively low elasticity, these cuts will not
result in a significant increase in trade. 93 The items which could
have produced increases in trade for these countries, such as meat,
rice, sugar, and tobacco, were not offered concessions by developed
countries. 94 Thus, the focus of the negotiations and the resulting
tariff codes ignored the developmental needs of the world's less de-
veloped countries. 95
In calculating the achievements of the Tokyo Round the legal
87. See Graham, supra note 5, at 160-61. For more information on the tariff negotia-
tions, see GATT, Basic Documentation for the TarffiStudy, in SEEKING A NEW ACCOMODA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS, A REPORT OF THE TRILATERAL TASK FORCE ON
COMMODITY ISSUES (1976).
88. Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 23. See generally Fiallo, The Negotiation Strategy of De-
veloping Countries in the Field of Trade Liberalization, II J. WORLD TRADE L. 203 (1977).
This article draws attention to the shortcomings in the present method of negotiation be-
tween developing and developed countries in the field of trade liberalization. He explains
that more effective means are required and offers proposals which attempt to redress the
imbalance in their respective negotiating strengths.
89. Id
90. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1979, at DI, col. 4.
91. Id
92. Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 11-14. Talks on tropical products were initially singled
out in the Tokyo Declaration as being of special importance to developing nations. Hence,
with general consensus the developed countries entered this group of negotiations with a
liberating spirit and offered several improvements in the treatment of these particular ex-
ports. These concessions generally involve tariffcuts with specific amounts ranging by coun-
try.
93. As noted by Ibrahim, the "UNDP/UNCTAD Interregional Project on the MTN,"
Geneva, is presently undertaking an analysis of all the tropical products offers. Id at 24.
94. See Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 24. See also Golt, Accessfor the Exports of Develop-
ing Countries, IN SEARCH OF A NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER (H. Corbet & J. Jackson
eds. 1974), cited in Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 25 n.73.
95. On April 11, 1979, developing country participants in the Tokyo Round issued a
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result of the negotiations should not be ignored. Even its modest
accomplishments may become illusory if there is legal uncertainty
about the treaty. The actual effect of the treaty in the international
trading community depends on whether it acquires the requisite
signatures to be considered a revision of GATT. If accepted as an
amendment to GATT, the treaty would obligate all GATT parties
to adopt the new trade concessions.9 6 However, if the requisite sig-
natures for formal amendment are not secured, and the legal status
of the treaty falls outside the GATT system, only signatory coun-
tries will be obligated to grant the agreed concessions. 97 Thus, non-
signatory GATT members will be allowed its benefits without ex-
posing their activities to regulation.98 Consequently, the legal char-
acter of the treaty is determinative of which nations may receive the
benefits of the agreement without incurring any cost.
III. LEGAL EFFECT OF THE TOKYO ROUND
A. Article XXX Requirements
The procedure for modification or amendment of GATT 99 dic-
statement to the Trade Negotiations Committee, the steering body for the negotiations, stat-
ing:
We regret that the multilateral trade negotiations have failed to achieve greater
results in substance as well as in scope for the trade of the developing countries
within the objectives and principles set out in the Tokyo Declaration. At this stage
we are not able to assess results because negotiations are not completed in tariffand
some non-tariff measures and it shall take time to have a complete picture of the
results in relation to objectives for developing countries' trade in the Tokyo Decla-
ration ....
Statement on Behalf of Developing Countries by Dr. Tomic of Yugoslavia (April 11, 1979)
in Graham, supra note 5, at 154 n.5. It should be noted, however, that the United States had
concluded some twenty bilateral agreements with developing countries during the course of
the Tokyo Round. These agreements, which cover both tariff and non-tariff matters, were
concluded with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti,
India, Israel, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.
96. See GATT, supra note 2, art. XXX, 4 BISD, supra note 12. These requirements are
discussed in more detail infra.
97. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 81.
98. See GATT, supra note 2, art. I, The Most-Favored-Nation Principle; 4 BISD, supra
note 12.
99. As provided in Article XXX:
i. Except where provision for modification is made elsewhere in this Agreement,
amendments to the provisions of Article XXIX of this Article shall become
effective upon acceptance by all the contracting parties, and other amendments
to this Agreement shall become effective, in respect of those contracting parties
which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties
and thereafter for each other contracting party-upon acceptance by it.
2. Any contracting party accepting an amendment to this Agreement shall deposit
an instrument of acceptance with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
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tates that any amendments to Part I (the Most-Favored-Nation
clause), to Article XXIX (the relation of the General Agreement to
the Havana Charter), or to Article XXX (Amendments) will be-
come effective only upon acceptance by all contracting parties.
Other amendments become effective "in respect of those con-
tracting parties which accept them" when accepted by two-thirds of
the GATT members."o The effect of this provision is that no con-
tracting party can be bound by any amendment to the General
Agreement or its schedules of tariff concessions unless it so agrees:
member-states reserve the right to accept or reject obligations under
the GATT legal system.'
Problems can therefore arise when amendments are made to
apply only to some countries and not to others. This creates the
possibility of confusing divergence among the obligations of mem-
bers, making it difficult to determine which GATT rights are en-
forceable by which contracting parties at any given time.' 02
Similar difficulties arise with respect to tariff concessions nego-
tiated by members of GATT outside the framework of the organi-
zation. 10 3 Trade concessions made during negotiations under the
auspices of GATT are incorporated into the General Agreement
only when the required number of signatures has been tendered. If
the requisite number of signatures are not received the negotiated
codes lose their character as revisions of GATT and are consid-
within such period as the Contracting Parties may specify. The Contracting
Parties may decide that any amendment made effective under this Article is of
such a nature that any contracting party which has not accepted it within a
period specified by the Contracting Parties shall be free to withdraw from this
Agreement, or to remain a contracting party with the consent of the Con-
tracting Parties.
GATT, supra note 2, art. XXX; 4 BISD, supra note 12.
100. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXX, para. 1; 4 BISD, supra note 12.
101. JACKSON, supra note 2, at § 3.6, on amending the GATT. Because one nation still
has not accepted an Amendment, it remains technically not in effect (PRT/2, p.5 L/2575);
yet subsequent changes to the schedules have been embodied in a series of "certificates"
(GATT, Certification Relating to Rectifications and Modifications of Schedules to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, January 15, 1963).
102. Id
103. Paragraph 7 of "Notes Relating to Procedures for Negotiations between two or
more Contracting Parties" reads: "It was agreed in the course of the discussion of these rules
to record in the report of the working party its understanding that there is nothing in the
General Agreement which prevents individual parties contracting from negotiating with
each other outside the scope of the Agreement. The rules proposed are not meant to apply to
such cases, but only to cases where contracting parties wish to enter into negotiations with a
view to the incorporation of the resuls of such negotiations into the General Agreement." 2
BISD 168 (1952), citedin J. KOLASA, LAW MAKING AND LAW ENFORCING FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 18 n.41 (1976).
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ered "side-agreements," binding only upon signatory countries. 4"
Although all benefits resulting from any negotiations are extended
through the most-favored-nation clause to all parties to GATT,
0 5
such "side-agreements" do not appear in the form of schedules of
tariff concessions to the General Agreement and therefore do not
constitute a part of GATT. These arrangements become treaty ob-
ligations, not provisions of the General Agreement. As collateral
agreements the rules and procedures enacted by the organs of
GATT do not apply to these treaties. Hence members of GATT
may enter into negotiations which may or may not become a part of
the law of GATT, depending on the willingness of the parties to
incorporate the effects of their negotiations into the General Agree-
ment.' 06
The results of the Tokyo Round negotiations may thus be in-
terpreted as a series of "side-agreements,"' 0 7 not as incorporated
revisions of GATT. Although the negotiations were achieved
within the context of GATT, their results have not been adopted by
a two-thirds majority of the contracting membership. Therefore,
the new trade codes are not amendments to GATT, but bind only
those countries who signed the final treaty. The legal status of the
MTN treaty then becomes totally independent of GATT in terms
of its prescribed changes to the General Agreement and the inter-
national trade framework. While the new tariff schedules could be
adopted as amendments to existing GATT schedules, 10 8 the new
codes concerning non-tariff barriers will not modify GATT, since
they represent a new area not yet contained in GATT."°9 Conse-
quently, any changes made in the international machinery can be
considered only as codes of conduct stipulated by the signatory
countries. The Tokyo Round did not supply the needed institu-
tional reform of the international trading system, nor did it provide
substantial trade liberalization as expected, but rather produced a
modification in trade schedules among a fifth of the world's trading
members.
104. The application of the Most-Favored-Nation principle to the new treaty provisions
will be examined infra at 319-20.
105. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 407, 531-72.
106. See generally KOLASA, supra note 103, at 17-19.
107. See JACKSON, supra note 4, at 407.
108. Examples of previous attempts to amend the GATT through side-agreements are
the Grains Arrangement (1967) and the Anti-Dumping Code (1967); which, once adopted,
were only applicable to those members who joined the agreement. Id
109. See KOLASA, supra note 103, at 15-19.
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B. Relationship of the MTN and MFN Status Under GA TT
Although the legal significance of the MTN treaty in relation
to GATT is easily determined, a major controversy may still arise
between developed and developing nations concerning the most-
favored-nation principle granted under GATT. I" 0 According to
this principle of equal treatment embodied in Article I, a nation
will benefit from duty reductions implemented by other nations
even if it does not reduce its own duty rate by an equivalent
amount."' In other words, the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause
extends any negotiated benefits to all parties of GATT on a multi-
lateral basis. This allows a contracting party of GATT to receive
not only the direct benefits from the bilateral negotiations in which
it has participated, but also the indirect benefits that accrue to it by
virtue of concessions granted by other parties in other agreements.
As a result, developing countries may receive the benefits granted
by the MTN trade concessions without incurring the obligations
enunciated in the new codes." 
2
To avoid sharing the benefits of MTN concessions, the final
signatories of the MTN treaty adopted the position that the benefits
and obligations of each code will apply only to code signatories -
those benefits not being extended to member countries of GATT
through the MFN clause."13 This is considered a "conditional"
most-favored-nation status, as opposed to the "unconditional"
MFN required under Article I of GATT.I 4 However, strict appli-
cation of the unconditional MFN principle provided by GATT
would preclude any limitation of the trade benefits to a limited
group of countries.' Confrontation over this issue seems inevita-
ble. At some point either GATT's MFN principle or the MTN's
conditional MFN principle will have to yield. Moreover, the appli-
110. According to Article I of the GATT - as noted by the Executive Branch in No. 9
GATT Studies at 133: "The unconditional Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) provision is the
cornerstone of the international trade rules embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. The basic rationale for MFN is that if every country observes the principle, all
countries will benefit in the long run through the resulting more efficient use of resources.
Furthermore, if the principle is observed, there is less likelihood of trade disputes." JAcK-
sON, supra note 4, at 515.
111. Id at 407; KOLASA, supra note 103, at 9.
112. Id ; see generally Espiell, supra note 21, at 29; Sorensen, Most Favored Nation and
Less Favorite Nations, 52 FOR. AFF. 273 (1974).
113. See Graham, supra note 16, at 38.
114. Id
115. Id; see JACKSON, supra note 4, at 515-72, for further analysis of unconditional
MFN obligations.
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cation of the conditional MFN principle could cause further disin-
tegration of GATT, from a broad-based international trading
system, into a series of narrow agreements leaving the institutional
framework of world trade weaker still.
III. SAFEGUARD CODE
In addition to the legal import of the new MTN treaty, another
dispute between developed and developing nations has erupted
over the negotiations of the proposed safeguard code. 6 This code
would allow a country to impose emergency import restrictions
against disruptive imports, 7 allowing nations to restrict imports of
particular products in order to afford domestic producers tempo-
rary relief from injurious import competition.' 8 In effect, the code
provides a safety valve to countries when import competition seri-
ously injures a domestic industry and idles its workers.
Article XIX of GATT contains "escape clauses" that permit
the use of temporary import barriers, provided certain conditions
are met." 9 A country planning to invoke the escape clause must
notify the GATT secretariat in advance and consult affected con-
tracting parties upon request. If consultations between the two na-
tions do not produce agreement, the party invoking the escape
clause may raise trade barriers for the products concerned. 2 ° Af-
fected countries may, however, extract "substantially equivalent
concessions" by erecting trade barriers of their own.' 2 '
The most important issue in the safeguards dispute is the use
of selective safeguards that lack the most-favored-nation element.
The history of Article XIX clearly establishes that escape clause
116. Graham, supra note 16, at 24-27. "Safeguards" are import restrictions used by gov-
ernments to permit domestic industries to adjust to growing competition from foreign indus-
tries. For a further discussion of safeguards, see CLINE, KRONSJO & WILLIAMs, supra note
65, at75.
117. See Graham, supra note 16, at 24-27.
118. These conditions are that: "As a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under [the] Agreement . . . [a] product is
being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury. GATT, supra note 2, at
art. XIX(I)(a); 4 BISD, supra note 12, at 24 n.79.
119. Id There are also related provisions in United States legislation which contain such
escape clauses that permit temporary use of import barriers in such cases; see 19 U.S.C.
2251-2253 (1976).
120. Article XIX(2) of the GATT provides that advance notice can be dispensed with
"[in critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to
repair. ... See Graham, supra note 16, at 24 n.80.
121. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XIX(l)(b); 4 BISD, supra note 12.
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actions are to be taken on a most-favored-nation basis: a country
must apply temporary import restrictions equally to imports of all
sources. The problem with this requirement is that in recent years
countries have, for political reasons, chosen to restrict imports on a
selective basis; that is, against products of only one or two coun-
tries.' 22 The EEC insists on the right to apply such safeguards se-
lectively against products of individual countries. 123  The
developing countries, however, strongly oppose discrimination be-
tween sources, supporting a more selective approach, if accompa-
nied by strict conditions.' 24 Developing countries assert they will
be the obvious victims of such selective safeguards because of their
rapidly improving export performances in particular sectors, 25 and
that because of their relative political weakness, they will be easy
targets for selective safeguards. 26  Selective action in imposing
safeguards may also effectively circumvent GATT discipline in the
future treatment of the MFN principle.
The Tokyo Round negotiations failed to produce an agree-
ment on the issue of safeguards. Nonetheless, the EEC has re-
served the right to apply selective safeguards as proscribed by
GATT, 27 and has conditioned its acceptance of the MTN upon the
future adoption of a selective safeguard code by the MTN signato-
ries. 128 Hence, even though the EEC cannot be expected to come
up with the necessary two-thirds majority to amend Article XIX of
GATT to allow selective safeguards, there have been strong indica-
tions by the signing parties of the MTN treaty that the safeguard
code will be accepted as an amendment to the MTN treaty. 29 As a
122. Id. at 26.
123. Id.; BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 57, at 33; Graham, supra note 5, at 174.
124. Id
125. BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 57, at 33.
126. N.Y. Times, May I, 1979, at I, col. 6.
127. Id
128. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1979, at 1, col. 4. The EEC has stated that their acceptance of
the MTN is conditional upon the final adoption of a new safeguard code by the signatory
nations. In fact, the United States Trade Negotiators met with the EEC in late September of
1979 to discuss the possibilities of the passage of the code. It remains uncertain whether the
current parties to the MTN will attempt to amend their trade agreement with the adoption of
a safeguard code. It is clear that the EEC has not given up on the action yet. According to
the team of United States Special Negotiators the chances at this time for the adoption of a
new safeguard code are about "fifty-fifty"; Interview with John Donaldson, Special Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiations (October 5, 1979) (unpublished remarks on file at the offices
of the California Western International Law Journal). Questions may also be raised over the
validity of EEC reservations upon the signing of the treaty; query whether they hold up to
the requirements in the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties.
129. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1979, § D; see Graham, supra note 5, at 174.
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result, conflicting rules would govern the imposition of safeguards,
developing countries adhering to Article XIX of GATT, and devel-
oped countries applying their own safeguard code.
Whether import restrictions against selected countries will be
permitted only with their acquiescence, only with the consent of a
GATT review body absent the acquiescence of affected countries,
or unilaterally if neither agreement nor international consent can
be secured promptly, remains uncertain.' 30 The absence of a uni-
form safeguard code will generate artificial shifts in the export mar-
ket, damaging the free interplay of market forces that indicate
international comparative advantages. The resulting uncertainty
among suppliers in exporting countries will undermine the stability
of commercial transactions and reduce the export earnings of all
nations, leading to reduced imports as well.131 Therefore, the costs
to the international trading sector of allowing unregulated safe-
guard actions may far outweigh the immediate benefits which ac-
crue to the domestic industry.
Any controversy over the application of the proposed safe-
guard code should be analyzed in conjunction with the GATT pro-
visions permitting import barriers, and in light of how those
provisions have been applied in the past. Any attempt at construct-
ing a selective safeguard code without majority consensus would be
a blatant breach of GATT.'32 Moreover, such disregard for the
procedures outlined in GATT could be deemed a violation of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 3 3 which provides pro-
cedures which must be observed when amending international trea-
ties. 134 Hence, an analysis of these instruments could present a
130. Graham, supra note 16, at 26.
13 1. For a further discussion of the possible effects of a system of unregulated safeguard
actons, see Murray & Walter, Quantitative Restrictions, Developing Countries, and G4 TT, 11
J. WORLD TRADE L. 391, 402-05 (1977).
132. Id at 394.
133. Openedfor signature, May 23, 1969, U.N./Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM.
J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is an agreement
among nations on the law governing the formation and operation of international agree-
ments, how they should be interpreted, construed, amended, and terminated, and fixing the
rules governing their validity. For further discussion of the Convention, see A. DEUTSCH,
AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 146-58 (1977).
134. Article 41 of Part IV of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the amendment of a
multilateral treaty by two or more of its parties is allowed if "the modification in question is
not prohibited by the treaty" itself. Thus, an agreement among the Tokyo Round signatories
to amend their trade pact to include a code which openly violates a provision in GATT
would derogate from those rights secured under GATT, and would therefore be incompati-
ble with the principles set forth in the Vienna Convention.
Vol. I I
21
Farless: GATT and the Tokyo Round: Legal Implications of the New Trade Agr
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND
basis under international law to dispute the validity of the proposed
safeguard code as it affects countries not a party to the new trade
treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether the results of the Tokyo Round will be deemed a suc-
cess or failure will depend on how the new rules fulfill the ambi-
tions of participating nations. Some will deem it a modest victory
for free trade, while others will condemn the results as reinforcing
the power struggle between developed and developing nations by
advancing only the limited interests of the developed world.
135
While the purpose of the new trade pact was to free international
trade, the resulting codes tend to promote protectionist tendencies
among a narrow group of countries that support free trade only
when they perceive it to be to their direct advantage. 136 Conse-
quently, the new trade system designed according to the Tokyo
Round may well be regarded as an erosion of GATT principles,
leaving the world trading order in worse shape than before.
Nations have been insisting for years that GATT rules and
principles were in desperate need of revision.' 37 Indeed, dissatis-
faction with GATT has come from both developed and developing
nations. Developed countries charge inadequacy in the GATT sys-
tem resulting from flagrant rule violations tolerated by the GATT
community, leaving a defective rules system that punishes those
who abide and rewards those who transgress.138 On the other side,
the less developed countries argue that industrialized countries
have manipulated GATT to suit their own ends. In short, while the
rules in some areas are considered sacrosanct by developed coun-
tries, they are often regarded as obsolete in other areas. Where
GATT rules do not serve the interests of the industrial nations, they
are ignored or repudiated as being inadequate. 39 Consequently,
135. A Modest Victory for Free Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 10, 1979, at 5.
136. As evidence for these charges, note the GATT Secretariat's conclusion from his
analysis of the new treaty: "[tihe tariff cutting plans finally arrived at will benefit developing
countries less than industrial nations." The Secretariat noted that the duties on exports by
developing countries would decline only about twenty-five percent - about thirteen points
below the average tariff reductions for developed nations of thirty-eight percent. GATT
Doc. MTN/26/Rev. 2 (April I1, 1979). N.Y. Times, supra note 10, at 30.
137. See generally Maciel, supra note 27; Jackson, supra note 30.
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while there is a general consensus that GATT needs restructuring,
the proposals for reform are supported by divergent trade policies.
The ability to rely on the common observance of international
trade rules has a great influence on the degree to which domestic
economies are going to allow themselves to be tied to trade ar-
rangements with other countries. 4 ° Admittedly, businesses in-
volved in international trade need a reliable and predictable legal
framework on which they can base long-range commercial deci-
sions and commit large amounts of investment capital. 14 1 Without
this consistency in the system, trading decisions are burdened by
the problems and costs of undisciplined procedures and nonobjec-
tive application of the rules.' 42 This lack of dependability affects
the health of domestic economies while impeding international eco-
nomic activity. 143 Continued divergent trade practices among na-
tions only serve to inhibit open and competitive trade, based on the
fact that risk and uncertainty are the main enemies of traders.'"
Long-term investments and sophisticated trading patterns will de-
velop only if businesses can rely on observance of the rules by all
nations. 45 For the international trader, stability and the elimina-
tion of uncertainty are primary goals of both buying and selling
activity. What was sought from the MTN was a reduction in the
risks and uncertainties of international trade. Unfortunately, the
new treaty only exacerbates the existing risks and introduces some
140. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 100.
141. Any business-affecting event that occurs in the period between commitment to a
fixed purchase price and realization of profit from the sale of that merchandise is obviously
undesirable. Experience demonstrates that such events are far more likely to be negative
than positive; in the case of government intervention, they will almost invariably be negative.
Rowland & Nemmers, After the MTN: What Is In Store For Importers? 9 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 207, 210-14 (1979).
142. For instance, importers cannot control, and are often unaware of, the export subsi-
dies or home market values used in the country of exportation; as a result, this can create
great risks and significantly reduce incentives to rely on the system. The new treaty will
make conditions even worse. Id. at 137.
143. For a further discussion of some of the domestic perspectives after the adoption of
the MTN see generally Herzstein, The Role of Law and Lawyers Under the New Multilateral
Trade Agreements, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 177 (1979); Bocskor, The Tokyo Round-. A
Labor View, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 219 (1979); Warne, A Consumer Perspective of the
Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 229 (1979).
144. Of course, it is also true that some importers will profit from these restrictions and
impediments to trade, no matter how badly others are hurt. Every price increase by import-
ers as a result of trade restrictions is traditionally met by a corresponding price increase by
the domestic competition. Thus, restrictions on trade are invariably anti-competitive, leav-
ing those importers who survive to appreciate the lessened competition. Warne, supra note
143 at 218.
145. See Hudec, supra note 28, at 1333.
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new ones, leaving the world trading order in a greater state of flux
than before the negotiations.
14 6
In sum, failure of the Tokyo Round to produce answers to
these institutional problems has left a dangerous void in the inter-
national trade system. Although the GATT institution does not
lend itself well to restructuring, an effective reform of this system
may still be the best way to attack tariffs and other impediments to
trade.'47 What is realistically needed from GATT is an instrument
of basic rules and procedures which will guarantee protection of
trade interests for all nations and create a regulatory instrument to
supervise the substantive results. In effect, GATT needs to be
changed from a passive instrument into an active forum which is
supported by a durable consensus of nations capable of resolving
the trade problems of the entire world.'4 The results of the Tokyo
Round have failed to provide a viable replacement for the dilapi-
dated GATT system, leaving an even more crippled framework for
international trade and renewed cynicism about future trade coop-
eration.
Nada J Farless
146. For the possibilities of institutional reform of the GATT rules see Jackson, The
Legal Frameworkfor Institutional Reform Regarding International Trade, UNDP/UNCTAD
Interregional Project on MTN (Geneva, April 5, 1976), cited in Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 26
n.74.
147. In Jackson's view, since" there is still much to be gained from international speciali-
zation and exchange based on comparative advantage, the best way to proceed in attacking
tariffs and other impediments to trade is under the auspices of GATT; see Jackson, supra
note 30, at 103.
148. See Hudec, supra note 28, at 1368.
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